Report Published December 20, 2011 Updated December 20, 2011

International Cops on the Front Lines of Fighting Terrorism

By:

Aki Peritz

As the U.S. draws down its forces from Afghanistan, there will be pressure to reduce our foreign aid commitments there as well. After all, while Americans back military aid, other kinds of foreign aid do not enjoy the same broad-based support. Slashing foreign aid would, however, degrade American national security by undermining programs that train local law enforcement abroad.

Local police are often the first (and occasionally the last) line of defense against violent extremism—cops help provide safety and security, the primary requirements of organized society. But corrupt, ill-trained police can actually spur violence and cause local citizens to turn away from the government, especially in war-torn places like Afghanistan. If the population does not accept those who are charged with enforcing order, society comes apart at the seams. If Congress does not continue to support these programs, lawlessness and terrorism might reemerge.

Training competent foreign police forces is in America’s national security interest. Therefore, Congress should improve these programs by:

Exercising greater oversight;
Rationalizing the training systems we have; and
Continuing or increasing funding levels for allied countries in the effort to bring stability to troubled regions.

The Problem

Training Afghanistan’s Cops is Extremely Difficult

The challenges of training the Afghan National Police (ANP) are extremely high—and so are the consequences for failure. As the country’s former Interior Minister has said, “Police assistance in Afghanistan is part of a broader state-building project which cannot be done cheaply, quickly, or in the absence of security.”¹

In Afghanistan, basic ANP recruits only receive eight weeks of training.²

Beyond the ongoing conflict, the overwhelming majority of police recruits cannot read above the 1st grade level and therefore cannot perform investigations or fill out basic traffic citations.³

The ANP often alienates the very population they are supposed to protect. A UN report from October 2011 found that Afghan police services systematically practice torture in the effort to obtain information or confessions, even against children.⁴

Many of these gaps stemmed from errors in basic training. As Army Lt. Col. Michael McMahon, director of the Afghanistan Focused District Development program noted in 2008:

“The first time they heard that they weren’t supposed to beat people, and they weren’t supposed to take their money, (but) that they were supposed to enforce laws and that their job was to protect the people, most police were surprised.”⁵

However, merely providing unstructured funding without a plan is not useful.

The U.S. has spent over $6 billion on the ANP and has theoretically trained tens of thousands of recruits.

Regular Afghan cops are nonetheless still ill-prepared for their jobs and hamstrung by a lack of mentors, equipment shortages, poor accountability mechanisms, and an extremely hostile working environment.⁶

Hence, without a solid police training system, the security gains made over the past few years could easily disappear into further chaos and corruption.

The Consequences

What Happens When We Rush Basic Police Training

Within the United States, some cities have experimented with rushed training, and have paid the price of having corrupt, violent, police patrol the streets.

In 1989–1990, the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department greatly relaxed vetting and training procedures to quickly process some 1,500 new officers. This led to a sharp increase in criminality and disciplinary proceedings within the force.⁷

By 1994, one out of every 14 D.C. police officers hired during 1989-1990 had been subsequently arrested for criminal offenses.⁸

America’s law enforcement professionals realize that initial training must be rigorous and thorough in order to field competent police officers. Most American police forces provide at least 20 weeks or more of basic training.⁹

Officials at the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) assess recruits are ill-prepared for real-life situations until after they complete their 24-week training.¹⁰ According to one LAPD trainer, recruits “are just barely getting the idea of how police and policing work” at the 8-week mark.¹¹
A recruit in Baltimore County’s 27-week police academy spends the first 16 weeks fulfilling academic coursework. Intensive scenario-based training designed to evaluate skills and performance does not begin until week 23.¹²

The Solution

What America Can Do to Improve Foreign Police Training

Local police forces require a long-term American commitment to develop and train law enforcement in countries with extremist and terrorist activity. There are several steps the U.S. can take to improve local police forces in Afghanistan and in other trouble spots across the world to ensure stability and thereby protect our national security interests:

Restructure U.S. policy on foreign police training.

With proper safeguards and oversight in place, the U.S. can use foreign law enforcement to reduce extremism within their home countries.

Scrap Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This section prohibits American agencies from training or assisting foreign law enforcement. The legislation was enacted because during the 1970’s, the USAID’s now-shuttered Office of Public Safety (OPS) trained police forces that went on to commit human rights violations.¹³ Repealing this section would allow the U.S. to coordinate overseas training efforts more effectively.

Empower a single agency to coordinate the funding and training of foreign law enforcement. Several different organizations currently train foreign police forces—the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, Homeland Security, and USAID—and all run different programs, with different standards, sources of funding, and congressional overseers. A new office, housed within the Department of Justice, could centralize and streamline these efforts. It would also centralize data gathering on this subject and provide best practices for future law enforcement challenges.

Rigorously enforce oversight and accountability of this coordinating agency. OPS failed because some police officers returned to their home countries and committed human rights abuses. These violations could be minimized by thoughtful congressional oversight over this training system. Congress could also tie funding to improved oversight and training—and reduce funding if certain benchmarks are not met.

Ensure that foreign forces are fully trained, equipped, and supported.

Asking poor, often illiterate police trainees in war zones to fight crime and battle extremists with inadequate training, substandard equipment, and little political support is a recipe for failure. Eight weeks is certainly not enough time to train a police force and would be unacceptable here in America. A U.S.-trained force should have a minimum of 19 weeks of basic training—the same training as a Detroit cop.

Get international assistance.

The federal government has attempted to train national police forces (like in Iraq and Afghanistan) despite our lack of a national law enforcement system. Since American police capabilities are mostly devolved to the state and local level, we should lean more heavily upon allied nations such as Germany or Italy that have federal police forces to train other foreign partners. After all, they have more experience in creating, equipping, training, and deploying such national-level law enforcement capacities than the American federal government.

Conclusion

In this era of financial austerity, Members of Congress might question why funding and training foreign police forces is important. But the police are often the government officials citizens abroad interact with the most. Making them legitimate law enforcers will provide a much-needed degree of faith both in our allies in dangerous regions and in U.S. foreign assistance. This in turn will help the population reject extremists in their midst.

Of course, no matter how well-trained and equipped, foreign police forces will not be able to stop all criminal behavior or political violence. But in troubled places, it is far better to have well-trained, competent police on your side than to face the alternative.

Endnotes

Ali Jalali, “Police-Building in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond: Successes, Failures, and Lessons Learned,” Event–Summary, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., May 25, 2006. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.aei.org/events/print/police-building-in-iraq-afghanistan-and-beyond-successes-failures-and-lessons-learned-event.
“The Gang That Couldn’t Shoot Straight,” The Daily Beast, March 18, 2010, p. 2. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/03/18/the-gang-that-couldn-t-shoot-straight.html; See also United States, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Digital Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS), “ANP Basic Patrolman Course adds an additional 2 weeks of training,” May 27, 2011. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.dvidshub.net/news/70504/anp-basic-patrolman-course-adds-additional-2-weeks-training#.TqGHY3LDV0t; See also United States, Office of the Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), “Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, But Capabilities Are Unknown,” Report, SIGIR 11-003, October 25, 2010, pp. 12-13. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/11-003.pdf.
Noah Shachtman, “If Afghan Troops Can’t Read Cat in the Hat, This War Is Screwed,” Blog, WIRED – Danger Room, August 23, 2010. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/u-s-hopes-afghan-troops-can-pass-1st-grade-someday/; See also United States, Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” Report, January 30, 2011, p. 61. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jan2011/HiRes/Security.pdf.
United Nations, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), “UNAMA report: Mistreatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan facilities,” Executive Summary, October 10, 2011. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1741&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID=15279.
United States, Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, John J. Kruzel, “Afghan Police Culture Evolves Through ‘Focused District Development,’” May 19, 2008. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49929.
United States, Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Report, GAO-08-883T, June 18, 2008. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-883T.
Keith A. Harriston and Mary Pat Flaherty, “D.C. Police Paying for Hiring Binge,” The Washington Post, August 28, 1994. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/dcpolice/94series/trainingday1.htm.
Keith A. Harriston and Mary Pat Flaherty, “D.C. Police Paying for Hiring Binge,” The Washington Post, August 28, 1994. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/dc/dcpolice/94series/trainingday1.htm.
Philadelphia: See “Police Academy,” Philadelphia Police Department. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://phillypolice.com/careers/police-academy. Denver: See City of Denver, Denver Police Academy, Training Bureau, “Denver Police Academy.” Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.denvergov.org/PoliceAcademy/tabid/395386/Default.aspx. Baltimore Co: See Baltimore County, MD, Police Department, Police Academy, “Baltimore County Police Academy.” Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/Agencies/police/careers/academy.html. New York City: See Telephone Interview with NYPD Training Bureau, Oct 16, 2011. Los Angeles: See “Academy Training,” Los Angeles Police Department. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.joinlapd.com/academy.html. San Diego: See County of San Diego, San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, “Become a Deputy Sheriff – FAQS.” Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.joinsdsheriff.net/faqs.html#4. Boston: See Phone interview with Boston Police Department, October 16, 2011. Washington, D.C.: See District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, “Police Officer Training.” Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/cwp/view,a,1230,q,538079.asp. Little Rock: See Telephone interview with the Little Rock Police Department, Training Division, October 20, 2011. Miami: See City of Miami, Miami Police Department, “Join MPD – Career Frequently Asked Questions.” Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.miami-police.org/careers_faq.html. Honolulu: See City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu Police Department, “MPR Applicant – Frequently Asked Questions,” July 28, 2011. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.joinhonolulupd.org/mpr/mpr_faq.htm. Chicago: See “Join Team CPD,” Chicago Police Department. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ChicagoPolice/GET_INFORMED/InsideCPD/JoinTeamCPD. Detroit: See City of Detroit, Police Department, “Police Career.” Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://www.detroitmi.gov/DepartmentsandAgencies/PoliceDepartment/PoliceCareer.aspx. Afghanistan: See “The Gang That Couldn’t Shoot Straight,” The Daily Beast.
Telephone interview with Sgt. Irma Krish of the Los Angeles Police Department Main Academy, October 20, 2011.
Telephone interview with Sgt. Irma Krish of the Los Angeles Police Department Main Academy, October 20, 2011.
Telephone interview with Sgt. Andrew Petras of the Baltimore County Police Department, October 20, 2011.
George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, Report, March 2008, p. 11. Accessed December 13, 2011. Available at: http://justf.org/files/pubs/080306read.pdf.